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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890472-CA
HANS JURGEN DROBEL,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over "cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the trial court violate Appellant's rights to equal protection of the law in denying
Appellant credit for time served during Appellant's pretrial incarceration?
2. Did the trial court err in allowing defendant to proceed pro se and represent himself
prior to and during trial?
3. Did the trial court deny Appellant effective assistance of counsel, due process, and
other rights in refusing to allow Appellant to prepare to represent himself at trial?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the body of this brief:
There are ten volumes of transcripts in this case and five district court pleading files and a sealed

file on competency proceedings.1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was originally charged in four separate informations and cases with four counts
of Aggravated Robbery in August of 1986 (R.86-1253 8-9; R.86-2541 9-10; R.86-2521 8-9;
R.86-2551 9-10).
On September 30, 1986, defense counsel submitted a Notice of Intent to Rely on a
defense of Diminished Mental Capacity, including a Motion for the appointment of two
examiners therein (R.86-1253 at 11; R.86-2541; R.86-2521; R.86-2551). Pursuant to said
Motion, hearing was held on November 21, 1986. Judge Sawaya appointed Drs. Breck Lebegue
and Peter Heinbecker to evaluate Appellant's mental state at the time the crimes for which
Appellant was charged occurred and to inform the court of Appellant's competency to stand trial

1

The first page of each transcript has a record number, but the pages included therein do
not have record numbers. Therefore, all citations will have two numbers, the record and the
attendant page number. The volume containing competency hearings on December 19, 1986,
January 30, 1987, and November 8, 1988 begins at R. 134. The volume containing competency
hearings on March 16, 1988 and October 21, 1988 begin at R.133. The volume containing the
competency hearing on August 23, 1988 begin at R.135. The volume containing the
arraignment begins at R.137. The volume containing the pre-trial motion hearing on February
3, 1989 begins at R.130. The volume containing the pre-trial conference hearing on February
17, 1989 begins at R.135. The volume containing the trial on February 23, 1989 begins at
R.128. The volume containing the trial on February 24, 1989 begins at R.129. The volume
containing the sentencing hearing on March 17, 1989 begins at R.132. The volume containing
the post-trial hearing on April 14, 1989 begins at R.133. The sealed competency file (in a
manilla envelope) begins at R.136. All citation will identify specific documents referred to
therein which do not have page numbers.
There are five separate district court pleadings files because originally, four charges were
charged separately then dismissed. The subsequent three charges Defendant was convicted of
in Judge Young's case was contained in one information and tried together. Judge Young's
pleadings file will be cited as R.89-0089. Judge Sawaya's pleadings files will be cited as R.86and the last four digits of the district court number appearing on the front of the file (86-1253;
86-2521; 86-2541; 86-2551) with the attendant page numbers.
2

(R.86-1253 at 19; R.2541 at 17; R.2521 at 17; R.2551 at 17).2 No examination in regard to
diminished capacity is on record.
On December 19, 1986, after receipt of evaluations and reports and based upon
stipulation of counsel, the court ordered Appellant committed to the Utah State Hospital for a
thirty day competency evaluation (R.86-1253 at 21; R.86-2521 at 19; R.86-2541 at 20; R.862551 at 19). This evaluation was apparently ordered because there was conflicting evidence on
Appellant's competency to proceed - Dr. Lebegue wrote to the court indicating that Appellant
was incompetent, while Dr. Heinbecker wrote to the court indicating that Appellant was
competent (R.134 2-4).3 Pursuant to the Order the Defendant was sent to the Utah State
Hospital.
On January 20, 1987, Drs. Austin, Howell, and Heinbecker of the Utah State Hospital
wrote to Judge Sawaya, informing him that they found Appellant incompetent to proceed (R.862521 at 26-27).4 No testimony was presented in court on the January 30, 1987 hearing counsel stipulated to the court deciding the issue on the basis of the letter from the doctors from
the Utah State Hospital (R.134 at 7). Judge Sawaya found Appellant incompetent to proceed
(R.134 at 7.; R.86-1253 at 31; R.86-2541 at 23-24; R.86-2521 at 29-30; R.86-2551 at 23).
On February 16, 1988, Drs. Austin, Howell, and Heinbecker wrote to Judge Sawaya
asking him to dismiss without prejudice, the criminal charges against Appellant to facilitate a

2

Though there was apparently no written Motion filed regarding competency, apparently
the issue was raised before the Court and the Judge found a sufficient basis to inquire as to the
Defendant's ability to understand the nature and consequences of the charges and his ability to
assist counsel to warrant a competency evaluation.
3

The letters are not contained in any pleading file or in the competency file.

4

A copy of this letter is contained in Appendix 1.
3

civil commitment of Appellant. (R.2521 32-33). R.136 letter dated February 16, 1988.5
On March 16, 1988, at the request of the Utah State Hospital staff, and with the
stipulation of counsel, the court dismissed, without prejudice, the criminal charges against
Appellant, pending his civil commitment (R.1253 at 33; R.2541 at 27; R.2521 at 34; R.2551
at 24; R. 17) and ordered to Defendant transferred back to the hospital. According to Dr.
Howell's subsequent testimony at the civil commitment hearing on April 28, 1988, Judge
Harding found that the hospital could not commit Appellant because he was not a danger to
himself or to others and because he could evaluate his own treatment needs (R.135 at 8-10, 2223).
On April 29, 1988, Dr. Heinbecker of the Utah State Hospital wrote to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, informing the prosecutors that Judge Harding had refused to civilly
commit Appellant, but had continued the hearing for two weeks. Dr. Heinbecker indicated that
the criminal charges should be refiled so that Appellant did not walk free. (R.135 at 3).6
(R.136, letter dated April 29, 1988).
An information was refiled on May 11, 1988, charging Appellant with three counts of
aggravated robbery alleging separate occurrences on August 11, 1986 (R. 7-8).
On August 11, 1988, defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the State
could not refile the case until it had rebutted the finding of Appellant's incompetency (R. 12-14.
On August 7, 1988, the State filed a Petition for inquiry into competency to proceed
asking for another evaluation. (R. 136, see Petition filed August 7, 1988 and attached affidavit).
At hearing on August 23, 1988, the State defense counsel argued for the release of

5
6

A copy of this letter is attached as Appendix 2.
A copy of this letter is attached as Appendix 3.
4

Defendant and an evaluation be independent alienists. The Court ordered an inquiry into
competency of the Defendant with the same alienists at the Utah State Hospital.
Appellant was then returned to the Utah State Hospital, as "not competent to proceed"
on August 24, 1988 (R.133 at 9).
On September 20, 1988, Drs. Austin and Howell wrote to Judge Sawaya, indicating that
Appellant was competent to proceed (R.136, see September 2, 1988 letter)7
On October 21, 1988, Dr. Howell testified how the doctors at the State Hospital initially
diagnosed Appellant as suffering from a "schizoaffective disorder", but after placing him on
numerous different psychotropic drugs in succession without success, the doctors determined that
the best route to solving the "puzzle" was to have the criminal charges dropped and have
Appellant civilly committed (R.133 at 3-8). This time, the doctors at the State Hospital
determined that Appellant was competent to stand trial on the criminal charges (R.133 at 8-10,
22-24). While the doctors felt that Appellant was suffering from a grandiose delusional
disorder,8 they found that his ability to proceed in the criminal justice system was not impaired
(R.133 at 9-10).

7

A copy of this letter is attached as Appendix 4.

8

The doctors were unsure of their diagnosis, indicating that perhaps Appellant was
malingering in some ways. See Appendix 4. Dr. Howell explained that the doctors came to
characterize Appellant as malingering, because Appellant had the gall to conduct himself in a
manner that did not comport with the diagnoses the doctors selected. He stated:
I think the malingering part has been his taking the part he wants to take. He
has not been willing to let us see that mental illness that we have concluded that
he has. We have come to that decision despite his wishes. We have come to that
decision by monitoring his mail with his knowledge. He knew it was being
monitored by information from other sources and these kinds of data. Now, in
our direct examination of him- and he has openly boasted to me that I will quote
"I will present the kind of picture I want to present to the examiners." He has
boasted that to me.
(R.133 at 14).
5

At the hearing on October 21, 1988, defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Howell,
establishing that Appellant's disorder had been manifest consistently throughout the proceedings
since the case was originally filed in 1986, through peculiar religious beliefs and behavior,
which were monitored and discussed by the hospital staff (R.133 at 10-12, 26, 29-37). Noting
this consistency in Appellant's behavior, defense counsel argued that the doctors at the State
Hospital were not in a position to offer an opinion contradicting their earlier opinions that
Appellant was incompetent to proceed (R.133 at 12-16, 23-24). That hearing ended in a
continuance granted to defense counsel, who intended to rebut the doctors' finding of
competency (R.133 at 38-40).
The minute entry for October 28, 1988, in Judge Sawaya's competency file, indicates that
Dr. Lebegue was ordered to evaluate Appellant again, and that the competency proceedings
would continue on November 18, 1988. (R.136) (Minute Entry October 28, 1988).
At the continuance on November 18, 1988, defense counsel indicated that according to
Dr. Lebegue, who had examined Appellant again, Appellant was competent but identified
reservations and cautions which the Court needed to monitor. (R.134 at 8-9).9 Judge Sawaya
found Appellant competent to proceed (R.135 at 10). (See also R.136 Minute Entry dated
November 18, 1988)
At this hearing Appellant asked the court to dismiss appointed counsel, noting that he did
not trust her (R.135 at 10).
Preliminary hearing was held on January 17, 1989, at which time Appellant was
represented by newly appointed counsel Manny Garcia (R. 9). Mr. Garcia also represented

9

A copy of Dr. Lebegue's letter to Judge Sawaya is included in Appendix 5. The letter
indicates that Appellant should be maintained closely during further court proceedings because
perhaps his "marginal" competency would shift to incompetency during trial.
6

Appellant at arraignment (R. 25). At arraignment on January 27, 1989, Appellant moved to
represent himself. Both defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney resisted said Motion on
the basis Defendant was not competent to serve as his own counsel. (R.137 at 1-6, 7-9) The
Court denied the Motion at that time (R. 25) (R.137 at 24).
On January 30, 1989, appointed counsel submitted a Notice of Intent to Rely on a defense
of Diminished Mental Capacity which included therein a request for the appointment of two
examiners (R. 26).10
On February 3, 1989, the court reconsidered and granted Appellant's motion to represent
himself (R. 27). At this time, the trial court reconsidered its prior ruling, ruling that Appellant
could represent himself with Manny Garcia serving as assisting counsel (R. 27; R.130 at 3-8).
The court discussed Appellant's "history of questionable mental health", and ascertained
Appellant's opinion that Appellant had never been mentally ill, and did not intend to follow Mr.
Garcia's recommendation to present a defense of diminished mental capacity (R.130 at 4-7).
Evidently, the Motion regarding the defense of Defendant's capacity was considered withdrawn
then withdrawn and no evaluation ordered.
At the hearing on February 3, 1988, Appellant indicated that German was his native
tongue, and requested the assistance of interpreters (R.130 at 10).
On February 17, 1989, Appellant filed a handwritten thirty-five (35) page Motion to
Dismiss Case, addressing numerous issues, including his lengthy and torturous pretrial detention,
and his inability to prepare for trial in the confines of the Salt Lake County Jail (R. 29-64). At
the pre-trial conference held that same day, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss,

10

Although Judge Sawaya initially ordered evaluation for two purposes, 1) regarding the
defense of diminished capacity and 2) to determine competency, the record does not reflect any
inquiry but as to competency was ever made.
7

admonishing Appellant as follows:
The court will deny your motion to dismiss. I need to indicate to
you, Mr. Drobel, that — and I would expect this same information
to be followed by you during the course of trial — you need to
know what a relevant fact is. A relevant fact is a fact of
consequence that deals with the charges that are alleged against
you. You are charged with three counts of aggravated robbery, as
I recall the information in this case. And you have given me in
this motion to dismiss multiple matters or facts and information
that you believe should relate to your right to have the case
dismissed, including, but not limited to the fact that you have had
significant employment in jobs as supermarket manager or in sales
of items to the Arabian nations. You should understand that all of
that information is fundamentally irrelevant to whether or not you
committed the offense as charged against you.
(R.131at3-4).
No other Motions were filed or made by the Defendant prior to trial. He submitted no
motions to sever the three counts, to suppress eye witness identifications, nor to suppress his
incriminating statements taken while Appellant was suspected of a crime and in police custody.
Appellant was tried by a jury on February 23, 1989, and convicted of three counts of aggravated
robbery on February 24, 1989 (R. 99-101). During the course of the trial, representing himself,
Appellant did not participate in voir dire, exercise any challenges for cause or peremptory
challenges, cross-examine any witnesses, object to the presentation of evidence, present any
evidence, or present any argument (see entirety of R.128, R.129).

No interpreters were

provided and no Motions were made at trial.
Assisting counsel's participation was limited to informing the trial court at the sentencing
hearing as follows:
Well, I maintain my position, your Honor, that I have taken all
along that Mr. Drobel is not competent to appreciate the nature
and severity of his acts and the nature and consequences of these
proceedings. And that's been my position all along.
(R.132at3).
8

On March 17, 1989, the trial court sentenced Appellant to three consecutive terms of five
years to life, denying Appellant credit for the two and a half years served in the State Hospital
and Salt Lake County jail (R.105).
STATEMENT OF FACTS11
On August 11, 1986, at about two o'clock in the afternoon, Susan Reed was working at
a fabric store, and she was robbed by a man wearing a-gun (R.128 at 16-31). At trial, she
identified Appellant as the assailant, indicating that she had been shown two photo spreads, the
latter of which contained Appellant's photograph. That photo spread was admitted into evidence
as Exhibit 5, as were a jacket (Exhibit 2) and a gun (Exhibit 3)(R.128 at 29).
On August 11, 1986, at about 3:30 in the afternoon, Jason Kim was working at a gas
station, and he was robbed by a man wearing a gun (R. 128 at 32-36). Prior to the robbery, Mr.
Kim saw the assailant handling a bottle of juice (R.128 at 34), which was admitted as Exhibit
6 (R.128 at 38).12 Mr. Kim identified Appellant in court as the assailant, without any prior
opportunity to try to identify his assailant (R.128 at 40-41).
On August 11, 1986, at about 6:00 or 6:30, Laura Nelden and Jeri Little were working
at a Hickory Farms store, and they were robbed by a man wearing a gun (R.128 at 64-84). In

11

The included statement of facts includes the testimony of witnesses at trial - testimony
to which Appellant provided no defense whatsoever. Appellant submits that the evidence at trial
is not particularly relevant to this appeal, that all issues raised on this appeal relate to issues
presented by within the statement of the nature of the case, and progression of the proceedings
as evidenced therein, and the determination and rulings made throughout the proceedings prior
to and after trial.
12

Police officer Jordan Hughes testified that he took the juice bottle to the state crime lab,
and indicated that Exhibit 10, a tie, and some unidentified exhibits were the clothing worn by
Appellant when he was arrested (R.128 at 43-49).
Police officer Kory Newbold took Appellant's fingerprints when he was arrested (R. 128
at 51-56).
Scott Schannon of the Salt Lake City Crime Lab testified that the fingerprint taken from
the juice bottle matched Appellant's (R.128 at 57-63).
o

court, Laura Nelden identified Appellant as the assailant, and had previously identified him in
the Exhibit 5 photo spread (R.128 at 73-74). In court, Jeri Little identified Appellant as the
assailant, and had previously identified him in the Exhibit 5 photo spread (R.128 at 82-83).
Ms. Nelden and Ms. Little called security, and security guards Daniel John Lund and
Ken Anderson followed the man Ms. Nelden and Ms. Little identified as the robber out of the
Hickory Farms store and outside onto the street for a short while, until the man they were
following was arrested (R.128 at 85-87). Mr. Lund said that during the course of their pursuit
he lost sight of the man for thirty seconds or one minute (R. 128 at 88). He identified Appellant
as the man he was following (R.128 at 88).
Michael Fierro, Salt Lake City Police Sergeant, arrested Appellant on August 11, 1986
(R.128 at 89-98). He identified the gun he took from Appellant, a tie tack Appellant was
wearing (Exhibit 10), and other unidentified items of clothing worn by Appellant that day (R. 128
at 93-96).
Officer Harvey Jackson indicated that after Appellant was arrested, he was in an
interrogation room with officers Jackson and Robinson, who asked Appellant to empty his
pockets. When Appellant complied, he removed some money from his pockets, indicating that
some of the money was from "the store", and that some of the money was his (R.128 at 99101).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In refusing to grant Appellant time credit for the 2 lh years served during his pretrial
incarceration, the trial court violated Appellant's right to equal protection of the law.
The court erred in allowing the Appellant to serve as his own counsel.
By failing to address and consider Appellant's requests for trial preparation resources,
Defendant's rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were denied.
10

Appellant is entitled to a new trial, a meaningful determination of whether he should
proceed pro se if that right is invoked, and reasonable means of preparing for that trial. Should
Appellant face resentencing after that retrial, he should be granted credit for time served.
ARGUMENT
I.
IN DENYING APPELLANT CREDIT FOR HIS TIME SERVED
DURING HIS PRETRIAL INCARCERATION, THE COURT
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION.

The Defendant was incarcerated for 2 V2 years prior to trial during the competency
proceedings, based on conflicting opinions on his ability to stand trial.
In State v. Alvillar. 748 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1988), this Court discussed jurisdiction
over the issue of when credit is to be given for pretrial incarceration. This Court first noted that
by statute, the Board of Pardons has jurisdiction over the question in some cases. Id. at 209.l3
However, this Court went on to recognize that in State v. Richards. 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987),
the Utah Supreme Court may have indicated that regardless of the jurisdiction of the Board of
Pardons, in some cases Equal Protection prohibits trial courts from denying credit for time
served. Alvillar. 748 P.2d at 209-210. This Court recognized that in Richards, the court found
that Equal Protection prohibited the trial court from denying credit for pretrial incarceration
13

Utah Code Ann. Section 77-27-5 (1953, as amended) currently vests the Board of
Pardons with jurisdiction over felony cases such as the instant one. It provides, in part,
(l)(a) The board of Pardons shall determine by majority decision when and under
what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state, persons
committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or
correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment, or as otherwise
limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or
have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted
or terminated.
11

served by a person who was financially unable to post bail. Alvillar, 748 P.2d at 209-210.
Appellant's extended pretrial incarceration was because of circumstances beyond his
control, and had the effect of delaying his trial over 2 xh years. Just as Equal Protection
prohibits denying credit for time served on the basis of an inmate's financial status, Equal
Protection prohibits denying credit for time served on the basis of an inmate's mental status.
Cf. Alvillar: Richards.14
While it appears that the Board of Pardons may have the power to grant Appellant time
served during his pretrial incarceration, inasmuch as the law in this area in not clear, this Court
should enforce Appellant's right to equal protection of the law and insure that Appellant gets that
credit by reversing the trial court's ruling and crediting the Defendant for his period of pretrial
incarceration.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
DEFENDANT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF.

THE

After being bound over on the case that eventually went to trial and at the arraignment
hearing on January 27, 1989, the Appellant made a Motion to represent himself with his
appointed counsel, Mr. Garcia, assisting him (R.137 at 7-8).
proceeded to inquire into his desire to represent himself.

At arraignment the Court

Appellant's appointed counsel

represented to the Court that the desire of the Defendant was against his advice and outlined the
concerns he had regarding the competency proceedings (R.137 at 11-12). Counsel offered for
the Court's review, the files regarding the competency proceedings on Appellant and noted to
14

See also State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261, 268 (Utah 1986)("If he is committed to a
hospital for a particular mental illness and pronounced cured of that illness before the five-year
minimum term has run, he still must serve the full prison sentence imposed. That is not to say,
however, that a person who is committed to the prison and then is transferred to a hospital loses
credit for the time spent in the hospital.").
10

the Court that "the very last thing that Dr. Labae [sic] indicated to the Court when he was found
competent this last year is he believes that Mr. Drobel is mentally ill and could become
incompetent again". (R.137 at 12). Counsel further noted that based on Dr. Lebegue's report,
one of the indicators that Dr. Lebegue noted could indicate that the Appellant was becoming
incompetent was coming true, that being firing counsel (R.137 at 12). Counsel also noted that
there was on file the Motion regarding the defense of diminished capacity and that in light of
the Defendant's desires to reject that defense that he had "serious reservations" about him
representing himself (R.137 at 13-14). Appointed counsel advised the Court at that time, "I
think that what he is doing is now completely connected to the mental illness, I believe he still
has in spite of being found competent and I want the Court to know that if you allow him to
represent himself that may be exactly what you are doing is playing into a delusion" (R.137 at
14). Counsel further advised the Court that in his professional opinion the client was "more than
likely expecting some sort of miracle resolution to this case, I would go so far as to say he
might even be expecting some divine intervention in this case, something like that based on
religious delusions, mental illness that these people have been able to isolate". (R.137 at 15).
After listening to the Defendant explain his position, the judge inquired of the prosecutor
as to his position on the Appellant's request to represent himself. The prosecutor, Mr. Stott,
then expressed his own reservations and advised the Court that competency to act as your own
counsel is difference than competency to stand trial (R.137 at 18). Mr. Stott represented his
concerns as follows:
"Getting back to the first finding of competency, I think there is
a real problem. I think that it is a situation where I would agree
that there is an indication from several psychiatric reports that the
Defendant is mentally ill. Now, they have narrowed that down
and they don't think it is a problem as far as assisting counsel but
I certainly think it might be a problem as far as if he were to take
over the case by himself, I don't think that would be appropriate."

n

R.137 at 19.
The prosecutor explained that if Mr. Garcia was to stay as co-counsel it may not be as much of
a problem as the Defendant representing himself. (R. 137 at 18-19). When Judge Young advised
him that "he wants to be his own attorney", Mr. Stott's response was "I don't think that should
happen, I would object to it because I don't think he's competent" (R.137 at 19).
The Court proceeded to inquire as to whether or not Appellant understood the nature of
the charges and the consequences if he were convicted of the same (R. 137 at 20-21). Defendant
advised the judge that he felt he was able to handle that and indicated to the Court "and running
a Court, a trial like this is not much different than running a company or doing some
negotiations with a hard to deal with opponent" (R.137 at 22). The judge then inquired of
Defendant's degrees and the Defendant indicated that he perceived self-representation was "the
only chance he had to win his trial" (R.137 at 23). The judge inquired of why he believed that
he would have a better opportunity to present evidence or a better method of presenting the
evidence than an attorney who is trained in law. The Defendant's response was as follows:
"You see you Honor, a lawyer and attorney is trained in the law
but excuse me for saying this, my experience with lawyers so far
in my life is that they are usually well trained in the law but they
often suffer under the lack of imagination, businessmen are better
trained in that. I don't mean to say anything negative to lawyers
but as I said, I've heard my attorney ten days ago, I've heard Mr.
Stott ten days ago, well trained no doubt but not good enough".
R.137 at 23.
The judge inquired as to any specific area of expertise or training that the Appellant believed
would suit him better to represent himself than having counsel represent him, he gave the Court
an example of running a company. Based on the Appellant's representations, the judge ruled
as follows:
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Alright. Based upon the Court's grave concerns as to the
magnitude of the offenses that are charged against you, Mr.
Drobel and based upon the representation of your attorney, Mr.
Garcia and the concern of the State and the apparent lengthy
history of mental concerns that have been expressed to the Court
today and are partially contained in the file, the Court finds that it
is not in your best interest to have you represent yourself and
denies your Motion and request to represent yourself.
R.137at24.
On January 30th, counsel for the Defendant file a Notice of Intent to Rely on Defense
of Diminished Capacity (R.26). For some reason, on February 3, 1989, the Court held a
hearing to reconsider the Defendant's request to represent himself (R.130).15 At that time the
Court made an inquiry as to whether or not the Defendant understood the dangers that were
incorporated by representing himself (R.130 at 3-13). The Court also inquired regarding the
diminished capacity defense that Mr. Garcia had filed the Motion on. (R. 130 at 4). The judge
then ascertained that the Appellant did not want to proceed on that defense. (R. 130 at 6-7). He
also discussed his prior competency proceedings with him and ascertained that Appellant did not
believe he had any mental difficulties. (R.130 at 4, 5). However, the record does not reflect
that the trial judge actually reviewed the competency files or saw Dr. Lebegue's report as
offered by Appellant's counsel at the prior hearing. Apparently, based on the Defendant's
representations, the Motion regarding diminished capacity was considered withdrawn and there
was no Order for an evaluation regarding that defense or any further inquiry made into it.
Although the Court made a further inquiry regarding the Appellant's education and his ability
to understand the English language, the Appellant indicated he had language deficiencies in
understanding English and asked that he be provided with translators. (R. 130 at 10). The judge
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It is very unclear from the record why the Court reconsidered the Motion except that the
Appellant evidently requested a rehearing on the issue.
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then inquired as to the English training that the Defendant had. He continued to make inquiry
about the procedures regarding trial. (R.130 at 10-12). The Court, after making the inquiry,
asked the Defendant "are you doing this as a voluntary act". (R.130 at 12). The Defendant
responded "I do". (R. 130 at 12). Defense counsel declined to say anything regarding the matter
at that time. (R.130 at 12). The Court then ruled that the Defendant would be allowed to
represent himself and kept Mr. Garcia as assisting counsel.16
Appellant submits that the Court erred in granting the Appellant's Motion to represent
himself for the following reasons: In light of the prior hearing and the concerns and evidence
raised by both the defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney, the inquiry regarding whether
the Defendant intelligently, voluntarily and knowingly waived his right, was insufficient as a
matter of law to meet the standards required to grant a Motion for self-representation. Under
the totality of the circumstances the Motion should have been denied on the basis that the
Defendant was not capable of intelligently, voluntarily and knowingly waiving his right to
counsel and invoking his right of self-representation. Appellant further submits that subsequent
to the Court granting the Appellant the right to represent himself, that the Court was put on
sufficient notice that that ruling should have been overturned sua sponte based on the
Defendant's demonstrated inability to adequately represent himself and understand what that self16

The Appellant submits that retaining counsel whom the Defendant does not trust as
assisting counsel to proceed on his behalf is meaningless under the circumstances of a case when
mental capacity is questionable. Additionally, what role the Court expects "assisting counsel"
to play is unclear, unhelpful and can cause "assisting counsel" to have a conflict of interest with
his "client". In this case, the Court defined Mr. Garcia's position as "advisory" (R.130 at 4)
which is not particularly helpful. That type of status as counsel creates a confusion as to the
legal and ethical obligations to the client, a confusion rarely clarified for the attorney by the
Court and one which this Court should clarify. In this particular case, the attorney was put in
the position by the Court of not being authorized to act in this client's best interests according
to his professional judgment and was forced by virtue of his "assisting" position to observe his
client act to his own detriment, meanwhile perceiving the entire time, that by virtue of mental
illness the client was incapable of ascertaining or acting for his best interest.
16

representation required in connection with procedure in Court. Based on that demonstration,
the Court should have sua sponte reinstated counsel to defend the Appellant.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled in Westbrook v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 150
(1966) that there is a distinction between competence to stand trial and competence to waive
counsel and that the same standards in connection therewith do not apply. In Faretta v.
California. 422 U.S. 806 (1975) the Court recognized the constitutional right to selfrepresentation but also established a standard to determine when a Defendant can validly waive
his right to counsel. "The accused must knowingly and intelligently forego the relinquished
benefits of counsel to represent himself". Id., 422 U.S. at 835. Furthermore, the Court stated
"although a Defendant need not have the skill and expertise of a lawyer in order competently
and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he "knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open". Id., 422 U.S. at 835. The Utah Court Supreme
Court has also adopted this standard. In State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) the Court
ruled as follows:
A mere finding of competence, without more, does not
automatically enable an accused to waive the constitutional right to
assistance of counsel and to conduct his or her own defense. In
order to assert the right of self-representation an accused must not
only be competent, but must also intelligently and knowingly
waive the right to assistance of counsel.
Id.,749P.2dat 1248.
Though the standard was set forth in Lafferty. the mechanics of that standard and how the Court
arrives at that determination has not been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court. However, the
federal courts have more specifically set forth this standard. In United States v. Padilla. 819
F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals reversed a Defendant's conviction with a
17

finding that he had not made a knowing and intelligent waiver within the Westbrook standard.
Determining whether a waiver had occurred, the court stated:
We recognize the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only
on the state of the record but on all of the circumstances of the
case, including the defendant's age and education, his previous
experience with criminal trials, and representation by counsel
before trial . . . we must consider the total circumstances of the
case including background experience and the conduct of the
accused person.
819 F.2d at 958. (Emphasis added).
In United States v. Moya-Gomez. 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988), the Court indicated that
a "more searching or formal inquiry is required before a waiver can be found. Id. at 732 citing
Patterson v. Illinois. 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2398 (1988). Additionally, in Chavez v. United States.
656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1981), the Court delineated the following standard in connection with
a defendant's waiver of any constitutional rights. The Court ruled:

"a defendant is not

competent to waive constitutional rights if mental illness has substantially impaired his ability
to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented and to understand the nature and
consequences of the waiver. Id., 656 F.2d at 518.
The federal courts have additionally noted that the standard of competence for making
a decision to represent ones self is vaguely higher than the standard for competence to stand
trial. Ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent. 526 F.2d 131, 133 (2nd Cir. 1975). In Blackmon v.
Armontrout. 875 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1989) the Eighth Circuit ruled that competence to make a
knowing intelligent waiver of counsel is not the same as competence to stand trial. It stated "the
standard for determining whether a person is making a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel is not co-extensive with the test for determining competency to proceed to trial.
In Chavez v. United States, supra, the Court also noticed that mental illness has substantially
impaired a defendant's ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternative presented and
1ft

understand the nature and consequences of the waiver that the waiver is not effective.
The Utah Supreme Court also addressed the requirement to examine the mental status of
the Defendant in connection with waiver of counsel. In State v. RupeU 631 P.2d 874 (Utah
1981), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court because the defendant had
not been made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. In Rupel the
Court considered the history and mental condition of the defendant observing that the defendant
had not finished twelfth grade and had suffered from a brain disfunction and dyslexia. For those
reasons the Court found that the defendant had not validly waived his right to counsel. See also
State v. Dominquez. 564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977). Ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, supra.
Applied to the circumstances of this case then, it is apparent from the case law that even
if the Defendant was being competent to stand trial, that does not necessarily make him
competent to waive his right to counsel. It is imperative then that there be a meaningful and
sufficient inquiry to determine whether or not that "knowing", "intelligent" and "voluntary"
standard has been met. The Appellant submits that the trial court erred in not making a
sufficient inquiry given the totality of the circumstances when considering the Defendant's
Motion. Though the Court, at the hearing on the Motion on the 3rd day of February, asked the
Defendant questions which were related to his education, age and the trial procedure and advised
of some dangers that may have grave consequences if an individual is to represent himself,
Appellant submits that there was an insufficient inquiry under the totality of the circumstances
of this case to authorize the Defendant to proceed on his own behalf for the following reasons:
At the arraignment in this matter, Mr. Garcia offered the competency file for the trial
judge to consider in connection with the Defendant's Motion. There is nothing on the record
that indicates it was formally or informally reviewed. Formal inquiry into the mental status and
the mental health of the defendant should have been made by review of that competency file.
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The gravity of this error is evidenced by Dr. Breck Lebegue's final report finding the Defendant
competent, provided he have counsel. (R. 136 Letter of December 1, 1988) (See also Appendix
5). In that report, Dr. Lebegue made the following opinion:
Therefore, I presently conclude that he is marginally competent to
stand trial". This marginal competency may shift to incompetency
during this trial. He still refuses to discuss his intended trial
strategy which I believe may be based on delusional rather than
rational and legal thinking. This delusional strategy may appear
only at trial thus, the court must be alert to irrational thinking or
behavior during the progress of the trial.
R.136, Letter of December 1, 1988, p. 2.
In the recommendations included in the report, Dr. Lebegue cautioned the Court as follows:
The Court and counsel must be alert to the emergence of
delusional strategy at trial, this might manifest in behavior such as
firing defense counsel, refusing to accept defense counsel
recommendations, insistence on testifying over defense counsel
objections, delusional religious thinking, grandiose denunciation of
certain aspects of. or even the entire, trial process or refusal to
attend trial based on the refusal to accept the validity of the
criminal charges.
R.136, Letter of December 1988, p. 4 (Emphasis added)
At the arraigment, Mr. Garcia put the Court on notice of those concerns in connection with
rejecting the defendant's request to represent himself. In discussing the Defendant's prior
history of mental illness, he stated as follows: "My information leads me to believe that based
partly on what Dr. Labae [sic] said and my talking with Nancy Bergeson, who represented him
up until she was relieved of the case before I came into it, that exactly what Dr. Labae [sic]
predicted would happen is happening and that is because of Mr. Drobel's mental illness in spite
of the findings by Judge Sawaya that he is competent to proceed, I believe he is either
incompetent or still suffering from a mental illness." (R. 137 at 13). This evidence and the other
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evidence regarding the inconsistent findings of competency and incompetency

17

regarding the

client should have, in and of itself, prompted the Court to make a determination that he was not
competent under the law to waive his right to counsel and was not doing it knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily as the legal standard requires.18
Additionally, prior to being allowed to represent himself, defense counsel filed a Motion
for an Inquiry Regarding Diminished Capacity and asked for appointment of two examiners
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The inconsistent positions taken by the State alienists is apparent upon review of their
opinions in the protracted competency proceedings. On January 20, 1987, the doctors indicated
that Appellant suffered from "a mental illness of the chronic schizo-affective schizophrenic type
associated with paranoid delusional features". On February 16, 1988, the doctors indicated that
Appellant suffered from "a mental illness of the chronic paranoid schizophrenic type associated
with delusional features". Civil commitment was then sought and denied. On September 20,
1988, the doctors indicated that Appellant suffered from "a very well circumscribed grandiose
delusional system that is solely limited to religious beliefs" and exhibited "no evidence of
schizophrenic illness". (See entire record of reports at R.136).
18

From a subsequent hearing during which the doctors at the State Hospital were testifying
in support of a finding of competency, it appears that defense counsel was concerned that
Appellant's religious beliefs made him incompetent to proceed because they induced him to
believe that he could prevail at trial in the face of formidable inculpatory evidence. R.133 at
26, 29-37. On October 21, 1988, when Dr. Howell was testifying in support of a finding of
competency, Dr. Howell explained how Appellant initially came to be found incompetent to
proceed:
Q. (By Ms. Bergeson) And you have previously, based upon this
mental illness, determined that he was not competent to stand trial;
true?
A. Well, we wrote a letter saying he was not competent to stand
trial and in candor part of that was we were baffled and we were
saying absent clearcut evidence to the contrary, this is the most
judicious procedure.
(R.133 at 11-12). Dr. Howell further explained that the doctors "had never doubted that he
understood the charges or knew the penalties, but felt that Appellant was not competent to
proceed because the doctors questioned whether Appellant would cooperate with his lawyer
(R.133 at 26). Upon cross-examination by defense counsel, who was apparently trying to
maintain the initial finding of incompetency by demonstrating that Appellant's behavior relating
to cooperation with his lawyer had not changed, Dr. Howell indicated, "Mind you, the law does
not say a person has to cooperate with his lawyer. The Law says that the person has to have
the ability to cooperate with the lawyer." (R.133 at 29).
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regarding the same. Though Judge Sawaya had previously ordered that evaluation, that inquiry
was never made evidently because of the initial findings of incompetency. Appellant submits
that in light of that professional judgment of counsel, which resulted in a second Motion to
determine whether the Defendant may or may not have had the requisite intent to commit the
crimes because of mental illness, that this was further reason for the Court to question the
Defendant's mental capacity to proceed on himself and waive that defense. He declined to avail
himself of this crucial defense in his case merely because he did not want to be found mentally
ill, the Court should have ordered it anyway because it was requested prior to his being granted
the right of self-representation.
An additional reason that the Defendant should not have been allowed to represent
himself is the inconsistency between the position taken by both the State and the defense counsel
at the time of the arraignment and the apparent turnabout that occurred at the February 3, 1989
hearing. Both counsel adequately demonstrated to the trial court that the Appellant should not,
in their opinions and in the opinions of the experts, be allowed to represent himself on the basis
that he was not competent either to make that decision or to proceed in his own best interest.
At the February 3rd hearing, the record reflects that the Court totally overlooked those prior
representations. Appellant submits that the trial judge at that February 3rd hearing simply went
through the motions to make a record of a voluntary waiver in effect, ignoring the mental history
and status of the Defendant, and therefore did not consider the totality of the circumstances as
U.S. v. Padilla. supra dictates.
Appellant further submits that subsequent to the Court's ruling on that Motion and prior
to and during trial, the Court was on notice that the Defendant was not competent to act in his
own best interest regarding his defense and therefore should have sua sponte reinstated Mr.
Garcia to act as defense counsel. This is particularly apparent upon review of the one pretrial
11

Motion that the Defendant filed, the lack of other necessary pretrial motions and conduct of any
defense at the time of trial. Judge Young aptly recognized the deficiencies when discussing the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Case, noting it contained for the most part wholly irrelevant
information regarding appropriate evidence in defense of the Appellant. (R.131 at 3-4). The
illogical grounds Appellant submitted in his Motion to Dismiss Case were as follows: Dismissal
of case in order to save State money; dismissal of case in order to avoid public shame on the
Court; dismissal of case to avoid unnecessary trial and after trial activities; evidence proving the
realization of the above-stated; and dismissal of case in order to secure peace and respect. (R.29)
Therein the Defendant proceeds to state that there is no evidence against him, and
concludes "the case cannot be won" (R. 38). He also notes therein that he is not a lawyer and
does not know american laws of justice. (R. 40). He also therein continues to persist in his
claimed defense of religious tenants as a basis to acquit him. (R. 41, 42). In keeping with his
religious defense, he describes the Lord as his lawyer. (R. 44, 46), describes his background
and history to indicate that he is not culpable of this crime and proceeds to identify certain
voluntary promises that he will make to the Court if the case is dismissed, including citing the
lyrics of the first few verses of the song America, the Beautiful to indicate his patriotism to this
country. The delusional tenor and nature of the Motion cannot be fully appreciated with a
review of the entire Motion. (R. 29-64, attached hereto as Appendix 6).
Needless to say, it does not present, for the most part, relevant, appropriate material or
argument for pretrial motions. The document speaks for itself in indicating that the individual
is not competent to proceed as his own attorney. The Motion is relevant for one reason. It puts
the Court on notice that this individual is not competent to continue to invoke his right of selfrepresentation. As stated in State v. Lafferty. supra, "This protecting duty imposes the serious
and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and
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competent waiver by the accused." 749 P.2d at 1248 (citing Westbrook v. Arizona. 384 150
(1966). In this case that duty was not met.
The absence of any other Motions or defense on the Defendant's part in the record also
should put the Court on notice of his inability to conduct his own case. Defendant was tried on
three discreet and separate criminal episodes in one court case before one jury. No Motion to
Sever was submitted to the Court. Appellant also evidently made statements to the police at the
time of his arrest and no Motion was filed to suppress the same. An eyewitness identification
on two of the charges at trial was based on the photo spread which should have been examined
to determine whether or not that identification would be admissible. The Appellant essentially
sat moot at the time of the trial and by virtue of that became a mere spectator at the proceedings.
It was clearly erroneous to find that a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver was
made in this case, and erroneous to rely on the same and continue to allow self representation.
Defendant should be entitled to have his conviction reversed and have a new trial with appointed
defense counsel with instructions to the lower court that if he chooses to try and represent
himself again, an inquiry consistent with legal standards must be made.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN REFUSING TO
ACCOMMODATE HIS PREPARATION FOR TRIAL.
Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806 (1975), outlines the Sixth Amendment rights of a
Defendant if granted his Federal Constitutional right to self representation.
additionally recognized in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.19
19

This right is
Conversely

Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
OA

however, the Court should be cautious when allowing self-representation to avoid that by virtue
of pretrial incarceration and the resulting hinderance on preparation that results, the Defendant
is not forced to become a mere spectator at his trial.
If this Court finds Appellant had the right to self-representation in this case, Appellant
submits that he was further hindered in effect in exercising that right.
After Appellant's lengthy and arduous pretrial incarceration, he was granted the rights
to go to trial and represent himself on February 3, 1989. His trial began on February 23, 1989.
On February 3, 1989, Appellant informed the court that he needed the assistance of
interpreters, especially to understand legal matters (R.130 at 10). His Motion to Dismiss Case
also requests that assistance. (R. 29-64)20 Nothing in the record indicates the Court granted,
denied or even considered that request. (R.130).
On February 17, 1989, Appellant submitted a lengthy motion to dismiss, which the trial
court rejected as "fundamentally irrelevant" the same day (R.131 at 3-4). While much of the
information contained in that motion was quite non-traditional, much of the information
contained in that motion should have been investigated and acted on by the trial court for the

witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
20

German is the Defendant's native tongue. The doctors at the Utah State Hospital saw
fit to have Appellant interviewed by a person fluent in German (R.133 at 7-8).
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purpose of determining if he could be adequately prepared for trial.21
After detailing the lengthy and Appellant's perceived unjust pretrial incarceration (R. 3134), Appellant explained that his right to go to trial and represent himself was an empty one
because, locked up in the jail, he had no way to prepare for trial (R. 57-64). Appellant specified
that he had been given access to an inadequate law library for only one hour, and denied access
to an adequate law library altogether (R. 60). He indicated that he was not allowed to have
books sent to him at the jail for preparation of his case (R. 60). He indicated that he was not
allowed to effectively use the telephone, and that he had not been in adequate contact with either
standby counsel or the prosecutor (R. 60).
It is acknowledged that a defendant should not be able to use his right to represent
himself as a means of planting error on appeal, and therefore should not be allowed to overturn
his conviction with a claim of his own ineffective representation in most circumstances Faretta.
n. 46, supra. However, in the instant case, where Appellant understandably lost confidence in
the assistance of appointed counsel, and was not allowed any effective means of preparing to
represent himself, his rights to due process pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 and
Article I, Section 11 of the State Constitution along with effective assistance of counsel were
violated.
In Milton v. Morris. 767 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1985), a pro se defendant who refused to
participate in his trial after being denied access to research materials, telephone, advisory
counsel, and means to subpoena witnesses, was granted a writ of habeas corpus by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. After explaining how the jail administration had defeated the trial
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See Haines v. Kerner. 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)(Supreme Court holds pro se pleadings
to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers").
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court's minimal efforts to facilitate the defendant's efforts to prepare for trial, the court
explained why the inability of the defendant to prepare for trial violated his constitutional rights:
We do not believe that a defendant who exercises his right, under Faretta, to
conduct his own defense must subject himself to the possibility that he will have,
through circumstances wholly beyond his control, no opportunity to prepare that
defense. The right guaranteed by the fourteenth and sixth amendments to reject
a lawyer and represent oneself is premised upon the right of the defendant to
make a defense:
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a
defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused
personally the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not
counsel, who must be "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation," who must be "confronted with the witnesses against
him," and who must be accorded "compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor." Although not stated in the
Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation - to
make one's own defense personally -is thus necessarily implied by
the structure of the Amendment. The right to defend is given
directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences
if the defense fails.
. . . An incarcerated defendant may not meaningfully exercise his right to
represent himself without access to law books, witnesses, or other tools to
prepare a defense.
Id. at 1445-1446, citing Faretta. 422 U.S. at 819-820.22
Because the trial court dismissed as "fundamentally irrelevant" Appellant's assertion of
his constitutional rights to prepare to represent himself, Appellant's convictions cannot stand.
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See also State v. Fairclough. 44 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1935)(right to fair trial is
contingent on defendant's ability to prepare a defense); Wickham v. Fisher. 629 P.2d 896 (Utah
1981)(state and federal constitutional standards require humane treatment of pretrial detainees,
require access to courts and attorneys); Borning v. Cain. 754 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.
1985)(directing lower court to hear habeas petitioner's claim that the Fourteenth Amendment
required his having access to a law library in preparing pro se appellate brief); Bounds v. Smith.
430 U.S. 817 (1977)(Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide inmates with access to
law libraries or assistance of attorneys).
9.7

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Appellant's convictions, and order the trial court to conduct
a new trial in a manner comporting with Appellant's constitutional rights after sufficient inquiry
and determination as to whether he should be allowed to proceed pro se, if Appellant chooses
to invoke that right again.
DATED this j ^ f o a y of September, 1990.

* & * ~

KRISTINE K. SMITH
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-5635
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that seven copies and the original of the foregoing will be delivered to
the Utah Court of Appeals and that four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this 24th day of September,
1990.
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APPENDIX 1

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
Established 1885

January 20, 1987

Honorable James S. Sawaya
Third District Corut Judge
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Hans Jurgen Drobel
Case No. CR 86-12^2, 1253, 1254, 1255

Dear Judge Sawaya:
We have completed our evaluation of Hans Drobel whom you committed
to the Utah State Hospital on December 19, 1986 for an evaluation and a
report to the Court as stipulated in Utah Code Ann. §77-15-3. Our evaluation has consisted of multiple psychiatric interviews, physical examination,
comprehensive psychological assessment, review of collateral information,
observation of his functioning in the treatment setting, and presentation
before the clinical staff.
We find that Mr. Drobel has a mental illness of the chronic schizoaffective schizophrenic type associated with paranoid delusional features.
His thought processes, affect, and ability to perceive and interpret reality
are each inappropriate.
We find that at this time he lacks the ability to comprehend the nature
of the charges against him and the punishment specified for the offense
charged and lacks the ability to meaningfully assist his counsel in his
defense.
It is our recommendation that the Court commit Hans Drobel to the Utah
State Hospital as "not competent to proceed" and order that he receive
psychotropic treatment based on the following information:
a)

There is a reasonable degree of professional probability that
with treatment the defendant's mental illness will improve to the
extent that he will become competent to proceed and, that absent
involuntary treatment, he will not within a reasonable degree of
professional probability become competent, and

Social Services
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Norman G Angus Execut ve Director
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Page Two
Honorable James S. Sawaya
January 20, 1987
Re: DROBEL, Hans Jurgen

b)

He lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision making
process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as
demonstrated by evidence of inability to weigh the possible
costs and benefits of treatment, and

c)

This is the most appropriate and reasonable treatment alternative,
and

d)

The Utah State Hospital can provide him with treatment, care and
custody that is adequate and appropriate for his needs.
Sincerely,

(J&*. i - Ctto$£'/ffr
Van 0. Austin, M.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychiatry
Utah State Hospital

Robert J, Howell, Ph.D. _.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology
Utah ^tate Hospital

Peter Heinbecker, M.D., J.D.
Clinical Director of Forensic Psychiatry
Utah State Hospital
VOA/ht"
cc:

David Yocum, Esq.
Salt Lake County Attorney
Nancy Bergesor
Defense Attorney
Byron Stark
Salt Lake County Clerk's Office

Enclosures:
Psychiatric Evaluation
Psychological Assessment
Social Work Evaluation

APPENDIX 2

££§S\
N CLERK'S OFFICE
'.' ^County

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL

Utah

1 6 193

Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
Norman G. Angus
Executive Director
Paul I. Thorpe, MSW
Superintendent

1300 East Center

^ r k

3rd Dtst

Court

P.O. Box 270
Provo. Utan 84603-0270
801-373-4400

February 16, 1988
Honorable Sawaya
Third District Court Judge
240 E. 400 S.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Hans DrobeL

Case

Hcfff86-U5£}
T R 86-1153
CR 86-1254
CR 86-1255

Dear Judge Sawaya:
The following is a treatment progress report on Hans Drobel whom
you committed to the Utah State Hospital as "not competent to proceed"
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-15-6.
We continue to find that Mr. Drobel has a mental illness of the chronic
paranoid schizophrenic type associated with delusional features.
During the past year Mr. Drobel has received intensive treamtent,
including individual and group counseling, participation in the therapeutic
community group processes, and a wide variety of psychotropic medications
in varying dosages. In spite of his intensive treatment program there has
been no improvement in his condition.
During our evaluation of Mr. Drobel and the subsequent attempt to treat
him, he has been non-cooeprative to the point of being recalcitrant. Because
of this and his complete lack of resopnse to treatment we have developed
some degree of doubt as to his diagnosis, In our collective experience we
have never seen an individual who appears to be as ill as Mr. Drobel, not
who has at least displayed some degree of improvement with treatment as
intensive as Mr. Drobel has received. We feel that it is possible that
Mr. Drobel is malingering, that is, feigning the symptoms of mental illness
as a manipulation. However, at this point we cannot say with a reasonable
degree of professional certainty that he is indeed malingering and is not
mentally ill. Based on the clinical picture he presents, we feel it is more
probable that he is mentally ill rather than solely malingering.

Page Two
Honorable Sawaya
February 16, 1988
Re: Hans Drobel

We would respectfully ask that the Court review this case using the
guidelines set forth in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). We feel
that Mr. Drobel has indeed been given an adequate trial of treatment.
There is a high degree of professional probability that even with further
intensive treatment his mental illness will not improve (if indeed he is
mentally ill and not malingering) and thus he will not meet the standard
for competency in the foreseeable future. If the Court does decide to
dismiss the charges the State Hospital would be willing to initiate civil
commitment proceedings in the Fourth District Court. Because of the
possibility of malingering, we would respectfully ask that the Court
consider dismissing the charge in a manner that would allow them to be
refiled at a future date if it is later shown that Mr. Drobel indeed is
malingering.
Sincerely,

Van 0. Austin, M.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychiatry

Howell, Ph.D.
and Forensic Psychology

Peter Heinbecker, M.D., J.D.
Clinical Director of Forensic Affairs
Utah State Hospital
VOA/ht
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April 29, 1988
Howard R. Lemcke
Oeputy County Attorney
Salt Lake County
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Uf 84111

RE:

Hans Drobei
Case No. CR 86-1252, CR 8b -1253
CR 86-1254, & CR 86-1258

Dear Mr. Lemcke:
On April 28, 1988 we attempted to have Hans Drobei civilly committed. The
court, however, refused to do so on the basis that dangerousness could not be
proved. The court reportedly would not allow evidence of Hans Drobei's criminal
behavior admitted into the hearing. As a result the court granted a two week
continuance so that everyone could decide what they were going to do. We were
quite impressed with the way Hans deported himself in court and now feel that he
probably is capable to cooperate with his attorney in his own defense. As a
result on this coming Tuesday I, Or. Van Austin, and Or. Robert Howell along with
the staff on 56 at the Utah State Hospital, will reconsider his competency to
proceed. My suspicion is that in the light of his recent cooperation with his
attorney that we will now find him competent to proceed. However, I believe the
county did drop the criminal charges against him and probably will have to
reinstate these charges to prevent Mr. Drobei from simply walking free.
Yours t r u l y ,

'&sn4ec£e^

4-

Peter Heinbecker, M.Q., J.O.
Clinical OirecLor of Forensic Psychiatry
Utah State Hospital
PH/ht
10Q-p56
(
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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
Norman H Banflerter
Governor

Norman G Angus
Executive Director

Paul 1 Thorpe, MSW
Superintendent

1300 East Center
P O Box 270
Provo. Utah 84603-0270
801-373-4400

September 20, 1988

Honorable Sawaya
Third District Court Judge
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 I
RE:

Hans Jurgen Drobel
Case No. 20220

Dear Judge Sawaya:
We have completed our evaluation of Hans Orobel whom you committed to the
Utah State Hospital on 8/24/88 for an -evaluation and-a report to the court as
stipulated in Utah Code Ann. 77-15-5, Our evaluation has consisted of multiple
psychiatric interviews, physical examination, comprehensive psychological
assessment, review of collateral information, observation of his functioning in
the treatment setting, and presentation before the clinical stafI.
At this specific point in time we find that Mr. Orobel has *a mental disorder
in that he has a very well circumscribed grandiose delusiona"! system that is
solely limited to religious beliefs. Although we have in the past reported to
the court that we feel Mr. Drobel had a mental illness of the schizophrenic
type, we can find no evidence of a schizophrenic illness at this time. Based on
his level of functioning since our 2/16/88 report to the court and our current
findings, it appears even more compatible to us that he was feigning the
symptoms of mental illness as a manipulation during his previous
hospitalization. We would respectfully refer the court to our 2/16/88 report,
we now feel that Mr. Orobel has been quite rational in his use o( symptoms of
mental illness to manipulate both the State Hospital and the Judicial System.
We find Mr. Drobel to be competent to stand trial at this time in that he
has the ability to comprehend the nature of the charges against him and the
punishment specified for the offense charged and has the ability to assist his
counsel in his defense. We feel that he is fully able to plan his strategy for
future legal actions in a very rational manner, when he wants to.
It is our recommendation that he be returned to the jurisdiction of the
court for further disposition.

an equal opportunity employer

Page Two
Honorable Sawaya
September 20, 1988
Re: Hans Jurgen Orobel

Sincerely,

Van 0. Austin, H.O.
Clinical and Forensic Psychiatry

Robert J. Howell, Ph.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology

VOA/ht
cc:

David Yocom, Esq.
Salt Lake-County Attorney
Nancy Bergeson
Defense Attorney

PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

DATE:

August 25, 1988

HANS JURGEN OROBEL

INTRODUCTION
Hans Drobel is a 46-year old married man who was admitted to our hospital on August
24, 1988. He came here for a competency evaluation from the Third District Court.
Hans is currently charged with four counts of aggravated robbery. He has been here
previously and initially was found incompetent to proceed. We felt that he was
suffering from certain delusions of grandeur of a religious nature which caused him
to hold up four stores in an effort to get money to support his new religion. He has
always denied complicity in these occurrences even though he was caught with a gun
and the money in the last robbery. He was also followed out of the store by the
clerk who never lost sight of him. During his last admission here we felt he was
delusional and treated him with a number of different antipsychotic medications as
well as lithium carbonate with no success. We felt that he was borderline
incompetent because of these delusions. However, in his commitment hearing before
the judge he was found not civilly commitable. We were very much impressed by his
performance in court and felt that his delusions were not interfering with his
ability to cooperate with his attorney and therefore felt that he probably would be
found competent to proceed if he were re-evaluated. Hans' only previous psychiatric
treatment has been at our hospital in the last year.
PAST HISTORY
Hans Orobel was born in Germany and raised there. He says he knows nothing about his
parents or any other family members. During my interview with him he was very
parsimonious with information and really unwilling to cooperate with the interview
fully. He said that he has received 12 years of schooling. He has been
self-employed all of his life. He came to the United States and lived in Colorado in
1981 and moved to Utah in 1986. Again his previous records document how he moved to
Estes Parkf Colorado and took advantage of the LDS community there and left owing
them a considerable amount of money. His wife and four children live in Salt Lake.
During his previous admission I talked to some of his friends in Salt Lake who told
me that one of them had been approached by him and told that she was to be his second
spiritual wife. He also had received a revelation in Estes Park which we were
allowed to see which seemed to be patently delusional. When I first interviewed Hans
Drobel in the jail over a year ago he refused to give any significant information.
Subsequently he was interviewed by Breck LeBegue and Breck found him to be extremely
delusional.

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
USH-66-1082

PATIENT
IDENTIFICATION:
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PAGE TWO
PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
HANS JURGEN OROBEL

CURRENT MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION
Hans Drobel is a man appearing to be about his stated age of 46 years with a beard.
He was somewhat thinner than he had been when he left our hospital last and was
somewhat more pale. He describes his mood currently as good. He sleeps well and
eats well. He denied crying spells or suicidal ideations. He denied any delusions
or hallucinations. I asked him about his religious affiliation at the present time.
He said he belonged to the LOS Church but did not believe all of their teachings. He
would not go into any more specifics. He was oriented to time, place and to person.
There is no evidence of organicity during my interview. He seemed to be of at least
average intelligence. Hans Drobel is one of these "true believers" who believes he
has special information received from God about his life and has attempted to live
according to these beliefs. He has no history of drug or alcohol abuse. So far as I
know he has never had a significant psychiatric illness. His past history while he
was in Germany apparently was that of a person who was unusual but I don't know that
he ever received any psychiatric treatment or was involved in any criminal behavior.
As I remember he caused some problems for his LDS Church associates back there in
Germany.
CURRENT DIAGNOSIS

Axis
Axis
Axis
Axis
Axis

I:
II:
III:

IV:
V:

Delusional disorder, grandiose type
Deferred
None
3f moderate
GAF score: 51

Titer He"inbecker, H.D., ~J.O.
Clinical Director of Forensic Psychiatry

Utah State Hospital
PH/ht
0:
T:

8/25/88
8/26/88

10Q-p78

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
USH--66-1082

PATIENT
IDENTIFICATION:
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PSYCHOLOGICAL ADOENOUM

DATE:

August 28, 1988

HANS OROBEL
Mr. Hans Drobel was readmitted to the Utah State Hospital on August 25th I
believe. He is back here to see if he is competent to proceed. I noticed that
Or. Heinbecker had diagnosed him as having a grandiose delusional disorder. I
agree with this diagnosis. I also believe that this does not interfere with his
competency to proceed. When I came on the ward today he was talking to the
elders of the LDS Church. He was animated and obviously enjoying his discussion
with them. I talked to him and gave him the Rorschach again. He completely
faked the Rorschach. All he would give was ocean responses. His x minus
percent was 91 and his x plus percent was 9. This was completely invalid
because he refused to respond in a flexible mariner.
It is my opinion that Mr. Drobel is mentally ill, that he does have a delusional
disorder of the grandiose type. It is my opinion that he is competent to
proceed. He knows what he is charged with. He knows he can be sent to prison
if he is found guilty and I believe he can cooperate with the lawyer if he so
desires. I am not quite sure why he was returned but he does present a very
interesting problem of pathology couched in religious terms which makes it a bit
difficult to sort out. I gave him the MHPI to take. He asked if he could but
then after I gave it to him he told me it would be several days before he would
have it done because "I don't work on Sunday."

Robert J.ftowell,Ph.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology
Utah State Hospital
RJH/hbt
D:
T:

08/28/88
08/29/88

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
USH-65 0982
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PSYCHOLOGICAL ADDENDUM

DATE:

August 30, 1988

HANS DROBEL

I talked to Mrs. Debbie Hippolite-Wright today about Hans Orobel. She described
him as being more talkative and friendly and engaging. She said that he seemed to
be "strategizing his present situation." She also said that she thought that his
religiosity has mellowed from where it was when he left here. She noted that his
son was on a mission for the LOS Church now. She also told me that Hans is
preaching on the unit. She commented that when Hr. Drobel saw her he asked her if
she had a hug for him and she held out her hand to shake hands with him and he
gave her a hug.
In my judgment Hr. Drobel is just engaging in more of his strategies and game
playing that he uses. I believe that he does have a delusional disorder of the
grandiose type but this is based primarily on reports we get from other people
rather than direct interview or testing. As indicated when I saw him on Sunday,
August 28th, he really did not cooperate well on the Rorschach so it was of little
value in helping us.

Robert J.yHowell/^f.D.
ClinicaKand Forensic Psychology
Utah State Hospital

RJH/hbt
0:
T:

8/30/88
8/31/88

6Q-p27

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
USH-65--0982
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DEC 1 3 1988
December 1, 1988

H DixocHir.dlev Op*^QVi:\

Court /,

Depuiy Clerf

Honorable James Sawaya
Third District Judicial Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Hans Jurgen Drobel
(fCRM2022JJ

Dear Judge Sawaya:
Pursuant to stipulation of October 28, 1988, I reexamined Hans
Drobel in the Salt Lake County Jail on November 15, 1988 for one
hour*
This written report follows my oral report to the Court,
Prosecutor, and Defense Counsel, that Mr. Drobel is presently
competent to stand trial.
I interviewed Mr. Drobel previously on December 8, 1986 in the
Salt Lake County Jail, and in my report to the Court of December
12,
1986, opined that Mr. Drobel was not competent to stand
trial. Since that time he has been treated in the Utah State
Hospital to attempt to restore his competency. For the present
examination, I reviewed the police investigation report of the
robberies committed in August 1986, and reviewed the notes of my
interview in December 1986, reviewed my report of December 12,
1986.
I also reviewed the State Hospital reports to the Court, which
are public record, of February 16, 1988 and September 20, 1988.
He refused to sign a release of information to allow me to review
the full State Hospital records of his treatment over the past
two years.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant is suffering from a mental disease or
defect resulting either in his inability to comprehend the nature
of the proceedings against him or the punishment specified for
the offense charged, or in his inability to assist his counsel in
his defense.

Department of Psychiatry
School of Medicine
50 North Medical Drive

Hans Jurgen Drobel
Page Two
OPINIONS:
1.

Mr, Drobel is still suffering from mental illness, probably
a delusional disorder of the grandiose type. He has improved
slightly, either as a result of treatment or spontaneous
progression, since I saw him two years ago. However, as a
result of his mental illness he was still very guarded in
interview, he refused to answer many of my questions, and
in my opinion is still suffering significant impairment in
his ability to think rationally,

2.

Therefore, I presently conclude that he is marginally
competent to stand trial. As will be discussed below this
marginal competency may shift to incompetency during the
trial. He still refuses to discuss some of his intended
trial strategy which I believe may be based on delusional,
rather than rational, legal thinking. This delusional
strategy may appear only at trial; thus the Court must be
alert to irrational thinking or behavior during the progress
of the trial.

Recommendations:
1.

If Mr. Drobel*s thinking or behavior during trial appear to
be irrational, as viewed by the Court, Defense Counsel, or
Prosecution, in that such irrational thinking or behavior
jeopardizes Mr. Drobel*s right to a fair trial, I recommend
that the Court recess briefly to confer with those experts
who have examined Mr, Drobel in order to determine whether
such behavior and thinking is symptomatic of his mental
illness.

2.

Mr, Drobel refused to tell me in interview whether he was
taking anti-psychotic medication, and refused to authorize
access to the records to verify this issue. The State
Hospital report indicates that he showed little improvement
with treatment with anti-psychotic medication, which is
consistent with the course of delusional illness. I am
unable to offer an opinion on Mr. Drobel's competency to
consent to or refuse anti-psychotic medication, and I am
unable to offer an opinion or recommendation as to its use
prior to or during trial. I do recommend a speedy trial, as
it is possible that Mr. Drobel will decompensate into
incompetency either from the stress of incarceration or lack
of anti-psychotic medication.

DATA AND REASONING:
Past history may be reviewed in my report of December 1986, and
the reports of the Utah State Hospital.

Hans Jurgen Drobel
Page Three
Mental Status Examination:
During my interview on November 15 he was alert, oriented, and
only marginally cooperative. I informed him that the interview
was not confidential, that I was appointed by the Court, and
that a report would be sent to the Court, the Prosecutor, and
Defense Counsel. I further informed him that any admissions that
he made to me in the course of interview could not be used to
convict him, and that he was free to decline to answer specific
questions because of the
non-confidential
nature
of the
relationship. Last, I informed him that if I should be called to
testify I must answer any questions put to me, even if this
occurred at the sentencing phase*
He refused to repeat my
description of the nature of the interview, which is a standard
method for assessing the competency of a defendant to proceed
with interview.
However, he said that he fully understood.
Throughout interview, Mr. Drobel*s behavior was a result of a mix
of symptoms of mental illness, and willful (successful) attempts
to obstruct the interview process, which were not based on mental
illness. For instance, although there is no evidence to indicate
that he has an impairment of ability to think and remember, he
initially stated that he did not know his criminal charges. This
is & clear example of a rational, willful attempt to obstruct the
process of interview, which is similar to other efforts he has
made to obstruct the criminal justice process. His frequent
refusal to answer many of my questions is indicative of both
both a willful attempt to obstruct the process, and a result of
the paranoia due to his delusional mental illness. However, with
some degree of patience I was able to proceed with enough
discussion of the legal issues to derive an opinion of marginal
competency, that I can hold with reasonable medical certainty.
Mr. Drobel fully appreciates
the nature
of the charges,
understands that he has an attorney to represent him, understands
the consequences "of various legal findings, and was able,
although sometimes unwilling, to cooperate with me in interview.
Specifically, he knows that he is charged with aggravated armed
robbery, knows that if he is found guilty he will be "punished by
the State, depending on the judgement", and if he is found not
guilty he will be released as a free man.
He says "I see very
clearly the whole process, I have no doubts or misunderstanding
of the American court system here in Utah".
There is no mental
process that interferes with his cognitive ability (his ability
to understand, remember, or interpret facts).
However, I still have significant doubts about his ability, and
willingness, to cooperate with his attorney in presenting a
defense. He states, and his counsel confirms, that he has
discussed his own version of his actions and whereabouts on the
day of the crime. He further states that he has not instructed

Hans Jurgen Drobel
Page Four
his attorney or made suggestions as to what to do, but rather "I
let her work with what she said*'. He says he will cooperate (in
a passive sense) with any strategy that his attorney devises.
He refers to his own strategy, which he refuses to disclose to
me, and says that he has not yet discussed it with his attorney.
He states that this strategy conforms to American law as he
understands it, and if he is told that his strategy trangresses
American law, he would accept instruction from the Judge and heed
advice to change his strategy. He refuses to discuss whether he
would fire his attorney and represent himself if his attorney
disagrees with this strategy. He admits that he does not trust
his attorney, "I have to be cautious, if I had a trustworthy
attorney I'd tell the whole truth".
During my examination two years ago he clearly stated that he
does not trust attorneys or doctors, and it appears that this
stance has not changed. He states that he will discuss his own
strategy with his attorney prior to trial, and I think we can
only wait until trial to discover whether this strategy is based
on mental illness, or based on sound thinking. The Court must
be aware that his strategy may be based on a grandiose delusion,
which he is reluctant to share with others because of his
paranoia. He may misperceive the entire criminal process, and
misinterpret it according to his grandiose delusional belief
system. It is possible that he will misuse the trial process in
a delusional way, but I see no way that this can be predicted
beforehand.
The State Hospital and the Court have already addressed the
issues presented in Jackson vs. Indiana, so he can no longer be
held as incompetent to stand trial, and he does not meet civil
committment criteria.
I can only recommend that he proceed to
trial.
Recommendations:
The Court and Counsel must be alert to the emergence of a
delusional 'Strategy1 at trial. This might manifest in behavior
such as firing. Defense Counsel, refusing to accept Defense
Counsel recommendations, insistence on testifying over Defense
Counsel objections, delusional religious thinking, grandiose
denunciation of certain aspects of, or even the entire, trial
process; or refusal to attend trial based on the refusal to
accept the validity of criminal charges.
If these circumstances occur, I respectfully recommend a recess
of trial in order to discuss the meaning of the behavior with the
experts who have examined Mr. Drobel, and a new determination of
competency based on actual observation rather than inference and
prediction.

Hans Jurgen Drobel
Page Five
Thank you for the opportunity to examine this difficult but
interesting gentleman. If you have any questions, please call
me.
Sincerely,
Breclc Lebegue,
Assistant Clinical Professor
Director, ForerisjLe Psychiatric Service
Diplomate, American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology
Diplomate, American Board of Forensic Psychiatry
cc:

David Yocura, S.L. County Attorney
Nancy Bergeson, S.L, Legal Defender
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